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INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Initiative in Michigan was adopted the day before
this symposium on direct democracy was held at Michigan State University
College of Law.
Let there be no doubt of its effects: it’s going to be a devastating event
for individuals of color throughout Michigan. I can back this up by the experience of California, after a similar initiative, also championed by Ward
Connerly, was passed there in 1996. Statistics are available about the effect
on admissions at the University of California Law Schools in the five years
immediately after the passage of what was called their Proposition 209. The
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. This is
based on a talk given at the symposium on direct democracy sponsored by the Michigan
State Law Review. I am grateful for all of their hospitality and kindness.
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percentage of minority students at state law schools, like UCLA and Boalt,
is a fraction of what it was at comparable private schools like Stanford and
U.S.C. The same effects have been seen in government contracting and
employment.
What I want to argue this evening is that the effects of Proposition
209, or your Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, are not atypical with regard to
initiatives, but are representative. Time and again, initiatives are used to
disadvantage minorities: racial minorities, language minorities, sexual orientation minorities, political minorities. Though I agree with so much of
what has been said by the other speakers today, each of them, to some extent, supported the use of the initiative process. Each of them, at least in
some way, seemed to advocate direct democracy as a good thing, at least in
some circumstances.
I want to take a very different position. I want to argue today that direct democracy is undesirable and unconstitutional. I want to argue to you
that the Supreme Court should find that the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative
is unconstitutional, and strike it down. So I want to make two points. First,
I am going to argue that direct democracy is undesirable. This is a normative argument; it’s not an argument about constitutional doctrine. Second, I
want to argue that direct democracy is unconstitutional, and make a series of
different arguments as to why.
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNDESIRABLE
So let me start out with the first, arguing that direct democracy is undesirable. Here I’m especially focusing on the initiative process, where
citizens go out and get signatures on petitions, to qualify the things on the
ballot. You heard earlier that about twenty-four states have such initiatives,
and the criticisms of them apply also to the referendum process, or even to
amending state constitutions, especially when it can be done by majority
vote.
A. Direct Democracy is Inconsistent with the Structure and Philosophy of
the Constitution
First, I’d argue that direct democracy is inconsistent with the structure
and philosophy of the Constitution. I’m not going to take this so far as to
make the strong claim that that makes direct democracy unconstitutional,
but if you think about what our Constitution is about in its commitments,
direct democracy is very inconsistent with it. I think above all, the United
States Constitution seeks to balance majority rule with the rights of the minority. This isn’t a profound observation; go back and read the Federalist
Papers, and you get a sense that those who are most responsible for drafting
our Constitution did want a society based on majority rule, but they were
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very concerned about minority rights. As many, most notably the late
Julian Eule observed, there are three main ways in which our Constitution
tries to balance majority rule with minority rights.
One way is that we have laws adopted by representatives, and not directly by the people. Second, we have a structure of government that includes separation of powers, and checks and balances, which serves to protect the rights of the minority. Third, we put our enduring values, our most
cherished commitments, in a Constitution that is very difficult to change. I
don’t think any of those three propositions is controversial. Let me elaborate, and show you why as to each, direct democracy can’t be reconciled
with them.
The structure of the Constitution is very much based on distrust of majorities. The things we all learned in junior high school civics make that
clear. Look at the institutions of the federal government. The President
wasn’t chosen by direct, popular vote. The President, as we all were reminded in 2000, is chosen through the Electoral College. The Senate, at the
time the Constitution was ratified, was selected by state legislatures. It
wasn’t until the Constitution was amended in the nineteenth century that
there were direct elections of senators. And of course, federal judges are
picked by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. Voters play no role
in that. Only the House of Representatives, out of all of the institutions of
the federal government, can be said to be truly majoritarian. That’s not accidental, of course. That’s because the Framers deeply distrusted majorities.
One might speak of this in pejorative terms as elitism, but it was based
on the Framers’ study of history. They were worried about factions, mob
rule, and they were very much concerned with protecting the rights of the
minority. And so they structured a government where there’s not a mechanism for a national plebiscite. This was pointed out in the last discussion by
Professor Sherman Clark. From time to time, there have been proposals to
create national plebiscites over national issues. They never got anywhere.
And I think the Framers would have been strongly condemning of the idea
of a national plebiscite. They wanted laws made by elected representatives.
They didn’t trust the people: that’s why they structured the government the
way that they did. And of course, the government they structured was all
about trying to diffuse power, to prevent tyranny. That’s why, for instance,
the federal government, as we learned in junior high school civics, has three
branches, with a separate executive, legislative, and judicial power. That’s
why James Madison said in the Federalist Papers, “[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”1
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., 2001).
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The Framers also, of course, diffused power at the federal level in the
sense of federalism; dividing power between the federal government and the
states. The Framers thought that the structure of government was the best
way to protect individual rights, including the rights of minorities. We all
learned, at least in first-year constitutional law, that the Framers didn’t include a Bill of Rights in the original Constitution, partly because they
thought it was unnecessary. They thought that the structure of the government that they created was sufficient to protect the rights of the minorities.
Now my view of separation of powers is a simple one. The Framers
wanted to make sure that two branches of government were involved before
government did anything important. Generally, adopting a law takes an
action by both the legislature and the executive. Enforcing the law to put a
person in prison requires prosecution by the executive and conviction by the
courts. Going to war requires two branches of government in the Constitution. The same goes for approving a treaty, confirming a federal judge, and
anything else of consequence. One of the things that’s so troubling about
direct democracy is that these structural protections fell to pieces. You
don’t need two separate bodies to be involved, only one. The voters are
able to take an action. That’s sufficient to adopt a law. The diffusion of
power that comes from separation, from checks and balances, is completely
absent.
Moreover, of course, direct democracy allows precious commitments,
including those found in state constitutions, to be changed by the majority
of the voters. When I teach constitutional law, I always begin the first class
by asking my students to think about how the Constitution is different from
any other law. And of course, the answer is that any other statute passed by
Congress can be changed by that, or the next, Congress. It only takes a majority of two houses and agreement by the President to change any statute
that Congress passes. That’s of course generally true of state statutes or
local ordinances. But changing the United States Constitution is vastly different. It takes approval of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states. That’s not accidental.
The Framers wanted to make sure that our long-term commitments
weren’t sacrificed to our short-term actions. They created the Constitution
as an elaborate edifice, to make sure that our short-term desires didn’t cause
us to lose sight of our long-term commitments. Direct democracy makes it
so easy to compromise that a state constitution can be changed just by an
initiative put before the voters.
The whole of this, perhaps theoretical, does still come down to the notion that the Framers were very concerned about protecting minorities.
Now to be sure, as was pointed out earlier, the minorities that might have
been of the greatest concern were wealthy, land-owning minorities. The
Framers weren’t concerned about racial minorities; if they were, they
wouldn’t have written the Constitution that they did that institutionalized
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slavery. But with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there
was obviously much more concern for racial minorities, and our concern for
minorities of all sorts in the political process is on that ground.
The reality, as I’ve alluded to, as others have spoken to this afternoon,
is that often the initiative process targets minorities of all sorts. There’s no
doubt that those who will suffer from the initiative passed yesterday here in
Michigan are racial minorities. That was the effect of Proposition 209 in
California. If you look at other initiatives passed, such as Proposition 187
in California, it’s a no-benefits of any sort to go to undocumented immigrants; again you see a specific minority being targeted. The English-only
initiatives again are targeting a minority language. The initiatives that have
swept the country, now adopted in what is the majority of states, prohibiting
same-sex marriage, are again trying to limit rights of the minority: gays and
lesbians.
Lest you doubt what I am saying about this, ask yourself the following
question: when was the last time that the voters passed an initiative to increase the rights of prisoners, or increase the rights of criminal defendants?
It’s hard to think of illustrations of that. The political process cannot be
realistically used to protect the rights of minorities, at least not very often.
So in this way, I believe that the initiative process, direct democracy, does
come in conflict with our constitutional principles.
B. Direct Democracy Often Makes for Faulty Lawmaking
But I would make another very different normative argument, and
that’s that the initiative process often leads to lousy lawmaking; that the
nature of the initiative process doesn’t lend itself to laws that are wellcrafted, well-drafted, or very desirable. There are many reasons for this.
One is that the checks that exist in the drafting process are absent with regard to initiatives. Usually a bill is drafted by professional staff in a committee of the legislature. It’s then forwarded to the committee to consider,
then it goes to the entire body. All the while, changes can be made. In bicameral legislatures, like the United States Congress, it will then likely go
to another committee, considered by the entire body. Differences, including
language, are then reconciled by a conference committee. It may be vetoed
by the President, or Governor, based on language, and then go back through
the process. All of that does improve the quality of legislation.
Earlier it was asked, well, can you really show that legislation is better
than initiatives? I think with regard to the quality of drafting, I can consistently show that legislation is better drafted than laws adopted via the initiative process. This isn’t theoretical or hypothetical, and coming from where
I live in California, I saw that when California re-instituted the death pen-
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alty, they did so by voter initiative. This of course was after the Supreme
Court, in Furman v. Georgia,2 invalidated the death penalty; then in Gregg
v. Georgia,3 the Court said that the death penalty could come back under
certain circumstances. There was an initiative in California to reinstate the
death penalty. It was, by any measure, a terribly drafted initiative.
And of course, it’s easy to understand why. What does it take to get
an initiative on the ballot? Well, at least in California, it costs several million dollars to do so, and that’s something we haven’t talked about today.
And that limits who can use the initiative process. But assuming you’ve got
your several million dollars, you then can go out and hire people to gather
signatures, you get enough signatures, and it’s on the ballot. That’s all that
it takes. So if you have somebody who’s wealthy enough, or who has access to enough resources, and they go out and get the signatures, it’s on the
ballot. They don’t need to vet the language of the initiative with anybody.
As a result of this, in the first 60-some cases to come before the California Supreme Court, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the California
Supreme Court unanimously overturned death sentences, based on the drafting of the language. It’s interesting that when Chief Justice Rose Bird was
being reconsidered for the California Supreme Court in a retention election
in 1986, opponents said that it’s because she never voted to uphold the
death sentence. In reality, in almost all of those cases, which were 7-0 or 61 decisions to strike down death sentences, Rose Bird was virtually never
even in a dissent. Why was that? Because the death penalty initiative was
so poorly drafted.
That’s not the only example of this, of course. I can give you one
more. California voters, in 1994, passed a so-called “three strikes” initiative. The way that it’s drafted, unlike every other three strikes law in the
country, is that the third strike doesn’t have to be a serious or a violent felony. Any felony can count under the California three strikes law. In California, if someone commits shoplifting but has a prior conviction for a property crime, the shoplifting can be charged as a felony. I argued a case in the
Supreme Court a few years ago, Lockyer v. Andrade.4 My client, Leandro
Andrade, was sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole for
fifty years, for stealing $152 worth of video tapes from K-mart stores in
California. He is one of 360 individuals who are serving a life sentence in
California for petty theft with a prior offense, stealing less than $400 in
merchandise.
As part of representing Mr. Andrade, in both the Ninth Circuit, and at
the United States Supreme Court, I exhaustively researched the history for
this California ballot initiative. It was all about wanting to put dangerous,
2.
3.
4.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
538 U.S. 63 (2003).
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violent felons in prison for life. The focus was on Richard Allen Davis,
who had kidnapped and murdered Polly Klaas. There’s nothing in the legislative history of the ballot initiative, or the media coverage, to indicate that
there was ever a desire to put people in prison for petty theft, or possessing
small amounts of any drugs. I think if the initiative had gone through the
usual legislative processes, this mistake would have been corrected. But it
wasn’t. It was just an initiative that was drafted by a group that wanted
tougher laws in regard to crime, and as a result, you do have people like
Andrade serving life in prison with no possibility of parole for fifty years,
for stealing a $152 in video tapes.
Another aspect of the initiative process leads to lousy lawmaking:
campaigns for initiatives are often deceptive. People often vote about initiatives without really understanding what they’re about. How many people
who voted yesterday for the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative thought they
were voting to advance the rights of racial minorities, to advance their civil
rights? We’ve heard two eminent professors from Michigan who said even
they got a little bit twisted as they were trying to explain what the Civil
Rights Initiative is about. The same thing happened in California.
C. Direct Democracy Distorts Citizens’ Policy Preferences
Now these were for high-profile initiatives. Often initiatives are of a
lower-profile nature. There are also initiatives at the local government
level. Sometimes as you read ballot pamphlets, to say nothing of the advertisements, you have no sense of what the initiative is going to do. California had an initiative on the ballot a few years ago that would restrict derivative suits against corporations and class action suits against corporations. I
would criticize both the proponents and the opponents of this, because if
you read all the ads, and all the literature, you’d have no sense about what it
was about at all.
The deliberative process, which the legislative process has much more
than the initiative process, is just absent when this is going on. Now I realize there are those who would defend the initiative process. There are those
who would say, well, it’s responsive government. The initiative process lets
the voters speak. I think that Professor Sherman Clark, earlier, developed a
powerful argument as to why it’s false to see the initiative process as reflecting voter preferences.5
I would elaborate his work, and the work of others, and develop a
slightly different point that hasn’t been expressed, as to why the initiative
process doesn’t reflect the will of the voters, and that’s because compromise
5. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 434 (1998).
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positions that reflect the majority of the voters often aren’t reflected in the
initiative process, which is binary; you vote for it or against it; there’s no
chance for compromise.
Let me explain with a simple hypothetical. Imagine that there’s an issue where the positions could be lined up from zero to ten; zero being most
extreme in one direction, and ten being most extreme at the other. Usually
those who are going to pay the money to have an initiative on the ballot are
more towards the extremes than they are towards the middle. And what
they’re going to do is to try to put an initiative on the ballot that’s as far to
their extreme position as can be, that is likely to be adopted by a majority of
the voters. And so, a simple hypothetical; those who support an initiative
on a topic might want a ten initiative, but they think the best chance is to
have an eight initiative, and there would be an eight initiative on the ballot.
Imagine that most voters in the state are at six on that issue. They’d like to
do something. They don’t want to go as far as the initiative, but they do
want to do something. Well, they would have a choice. Vote for the eight
initiative on the ballot, or do absolutely nothing.
Now in the legislative process, a compromise could be reached. You
could come to the six that reflects the majority of the legislature, and hopefully the majority of the people. But since voters don’t have that option,
they’ve got to vote for the eight. Now, it may very well be that the majority
of voters believe in everything that was adopted yesterday in the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative. But it might very well be that if they had a range of
options, they would have picked something that was less extreme, that was
more nuanced, perhaps something more towards the six, but that wasn’t an
option. I could give countless examples of this. This, too, shows why you
can’t assume that initiatives reflect the preference of the majority.
A second criticism of my position may be that I’m not being sufficiently nuanced as to the types of initiatives. And you heard some discussion that we should separate initiatives for perfecting the processes of government versus initiatives that target minorities. Perhaps we should say,
when it comes to initiatives that perfect the processes of government, we
should be supportive of them, and we should only be critical of those that
harm minorities. I’m always skeptical of distinctions based on process versus substance. I think one of the lessons we learned in our first-year civil
procedure class is that process and substance are just labels, and you can
really characterize almost anything as process or substance, if you try hard
enough. I think this is true here.
Let me give you an example: Proposition 13 was adopted by California voters to limit property taxes. It limited property taxes to no more than
one percent of assessed valuation, as determined at the time of purchase,
and the increase in the value of the property doesn’t play much role in increases in property taxes. Now, one would say, I think, that this is an initiative more about process than substance. It’s all about the process of deter-
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mining valuation of property for the purpose of a property tax. But this is
an initiative that has had a devastating effect on racial minorities in the state
of California, including by limiting the funding available for schools in
California. Of course, for those who are wealthy enough to send their kids
to private schools, Proposition 13 doesn’t matter very much. For those who
send their kids to public schools in wealthy areas, they can supplement the
money that’s gained through the property taxes because they are able to
contribute for book funds, teacher funds, after-school funds, and all the rest.
But for kids who go to public school in California, where education dollars
are very much dependent on property taxes, Proposition 13 has had a terrible and devastating effect. Is it process, or is it substance? Clearly, it’s
some of both.
If you accept my arguments in terms of the initiative process, I don’t
need to convince you that every initiative is undesirable. Frankly, I like
some of the initiatives that were passed yesterday, such as those that increase the minimum wage in many states. But nonetheless, I would take as
an overall position that the initiative process is undesirable for the reasons
that I’ve suggested.
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Arguing that the initiative process is undesirable doesn’t make a constitutional argument against it. In the second part of my remarks, I want to
argue that the initiative process is unconstitutional. I’d like to make three
levels of argument here, starting with the most general, and going to the
most specific, or to put it another way, starting with the most dramatic and
then going to the most specific.
A. Direct Democracy Violates the Republican Form of Government Clause
My most dramatic argument is that the initiative process should be declared unconstitutional because it violates the Republican Form of Government Clause.6 This little-known provision says, “the United States shall
guarantee to each state a republican form of government.”7 Now, contrary
to the wishes of the current occupants of the White House, this provision
has nothing to do with political parties. If one goes back, and tries to ask
what the Framers meant by a republican form of government, there’s a
strong indication that they thought that a republican form of government
was one where people would elect representatives, and the representatives
would then make the laws. They saw direct democracy as the antithesis of a
republican form of government.
6.
7.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Id.
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The problem, though, with challenging initiatives under the Republican Form of Government Clause, is a case from the 1840s: Luther v. Borden.8 Luther is one of the more extraordinary events in American constitutional history. It involved the State of Rhode Island, which didn’t have a
state constitution. It was still governed under a charter issued by King
Charles in the seventeenth century, and there was terrible malapportionment. So the voters considered an initiative. A new constitution passed.
The existing government then made it a crime for anybody to participate in
the election under the new constitution.
Nonetheless, an election was held. A man by the name of Doar was
chosen as Governor. He tried to govern for a few days. Ultimately he and
his supporters were arrested. And a sheriff from the existing government
broke into the house of somebody and said he was involved in the illegal
election. The person whose house was broken into sued for trespassing.
The sheriff defended and said, “but I’m the government! I’m not trespassing, I’m engaging in a search.” The person whose house was broken into
said, “you’re not the legitimate government of Rhode Island, because you
fail the Republican Form of Government Clause.” To which the Supreme
Court, seeing this mess said, “we want no part of it.” The Supreme Court
said cases under the Republican Form of Government Clause are a nonjusticiable political question.
Now, as with any case, the Court’s holding was limited to these acts.
It doesn’t need to be seen as saying that for all circumstances the Republican Form of Government Clause is non-justiciable. You might be surprised
to know that in Plessy v. Ferguson,9 in Justice Harlan’s famous eloquent
dissent, he invoked the Republican Form of Government Clause explicitly.
He was trying to argue why “separate but equal” could never be constitutional.10 However, in 1914, in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon,11 the United States Supreme Court considered whether a challenge
to the initiative process violated the Republican Form of Government
Clause. The Supreme Court, relying on Luther v. Borden, said challenges to
the initiative process through the Republican Form of Government Clause
are non-justiciable political questions.
The effect of Luther v. Borden has been to render the Republican
Form of Government Clause a nullity. It’s never been used by any federal
8. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Id. at 564. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Such a system is inconsistent with the guaranty given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, and may be
stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty
to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.”).
11. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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court, let alone the Supreme Court. I can’t think of any other Supreme
Court case that completely buried an entire clause. The closest I can think
of would be the Slaughter-House Cases,12 and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 There are at least a couple of cases,
including one in 1999, that used that provision.14
I see no reason why the clause should always be regarded as a nonjusticiable political question. In Baker v. Carr15 in 1962, the Supreme Court
announced the criteria for determining if something is a political question.
The Court said that one reason that something might be a political question
is if there’s a lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards. But
the Court could formulate judicially discoverable or manageable standards
here. If you accept my position, the Court could take the position that the
initiative process is unconstitutional because the Republican Form of Government Clause doesn’t allow direct democracy.
Another thing Baker v. Carr said was that things are political questions where there is a textual commitment to a specific branch of government, such as if the Constitution says something is left to Congress. But the
language of Article IV, Section 4, is “the United States shall guarantee each
state a republican form of government.”16 That includes the federal courts, a
branch of the United States government.
In 1992, in a case called New York v. United States,17 the Supreme
Court returned to the Republican Form of Government Clause. The federal
government required that every state clean up its nuclear waste by 1996.
Any state that failed to do so by that date maintained title to the nuclear
waste, and was liable for any harms it caused. One of the arguments made
to the Supreme Court was that it violated the Republican Form of Government Clause for Congress to commandeer the states in this way. Justice
O’Connor, at the beginning of her majority opinion, said that the Court
should reconsider whether challenges to the Republican Form of Government Clause are justiciable. She said that there’s no reason to believe that
they are always non-justiciable. She then said that the Court needn’t do that
in this case because the law violates the Tenth Amendment.18 I think this is
an open invitation to bring challenges under the Republican Form of Government Clause, to convince courts that cases are not necessarily nonjusticiable. If a court is willing to find such a case justiciable, then you get
to my argument, that direct democracy is inherently inconsistent with the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 183-86.
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Republican Form of Government Clause, the same argument that was made
in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph over ninety years ago. I think it’s
an argument that should be revived today. Indeed, I would say especially as
to initiatives that target and harm minorities, the Republican Form of Government Clause argument should be revived.
I’m very skeptical of Framers’ intent arguments in any context, but I
think I can make a strong Framers’ intent argument that the Framers were
very concerned about protecting minorities, and for that reason they disavowed direct democracy and saw the Republican Form of Government
Clause as the embodiment of that.
B. Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
Well, that’s my broadest argument as to why direct democracy is unconstitutional. Let me move to a slightly more specific argument. And that
would be, initiatives that disadvantage minorities from using the political
process should be regarded as unconstitutional. And for this reason, regardless of the Republican Form of Government Clause argument, the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative should be declared unconstitutional.
Here I think I have strong support from Supreme Court decisions. The
most notable of these is Romer v. Evans,19 from 1996. It involved a Colorado initiative that repealed all laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and prohibited any new laws in the state from protecting gays
and lesbians from discrimination. The United States Supreme Court, in a 63 decision, declared this initiative unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote
the opinion for the Court. He stressed that the Colorado initiative kept gays
and lesbians from using the political process, noting that all other groups
could do so. If a lot of investors wanted to go to the Colorado legislature
and seek some form of preferential treatment, they could do so. If journalists wanted to go to the Colorado legislature, and seek some form of preferential treatment, they could do so. If law professors wanted to ask the Colorado legislature to adopt a law that prohibited discrimination against them,
if journalists wanted that, or any other group, they could.
But one group was kept from using the political process: gays and lesbians. They were not allowed to go to the political process and get any laws
protecting themselves from discrimination, or any laws giving them preference. The United States Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional.
Strikingly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion used rational basis review, and said
that keeping a group from using the political process would not serve any
legitimate purpose and denies equal protection.
19.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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This isn’t the only time the Supreme Court has said this. You might
think back to the Seattle school case,20 where voters passed an initiative to
prohibit busing from being used. The United States Supreme Court said to
prohibit a remedy for segregation, and to prohibit busing in this way, keeps
minorities from using the political process, and that inherently denies equal
protection.
One might go back to an even earlier case, Hunter v. Erickson,21 that
limited the ability of the government to adopt open housing laws. I think
what these cases stand for is, if an initiative keeps a minority from using the
political process in the way that all others can use the political process, that
inherently denies equal protection. Isn’t that exactly what the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative passed yesterday does? The Supreme Court, in Grutter v. Bollinger,22 said that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body. The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative says that minorities in Michigan cannot use the political process, even
to pursue what the Supreme Court has expressly labeled a “compelling government interest.” Isn’t that disadvantaging minorities in a way that no
other group is disadvantaged from using the political process? In that way,
aren’t Romer v. Evans and the Seattle School District case very much on
point?
C. Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Should Be Subject to Strict Scrutiny
But if neither of these arguments have persuaded you, let me make
even a more limited argument. I would say that at the very least, strict scrutiny should be used for initiatives that disadvantage minorities from exercising their rights. This is an argument that the late UCLA law professor
Julian Eule advanced in a wonderful Yale Law Journal article, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy.23 The underlying philosophy of this approach, in
Professor Eule’s argument, was that the level of scrutiny used reflects the
degree of suspicion about the legislative process.
Generally there’s trust in the legislative process. So there’s great deference to the legislative process; that’s why rational basis is generally used.
But in those instances where we’re very distrustful of the legislature, well
that’s where strict scrutiny gets used. And if we’re somewhat distrustful,
but not as much, it’s intermediate scrutiny. But we all learned in first-year
constitutional law that the levels of scrutiny track the degree of distrust of
the legislative process. Professor Eule argues, I think persuasively, that
20.
21.
22.
23.

Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
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there’s great reason to be distrustful of the initiative process, especially if it
bears upon the rights and interests of minorities, upon fundamental rights.
Then the question would be whether an initiative like the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative would meet strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
My preference would be to see the initiative process declared unconstitutional in all circumstances and for all uses. At the very least I think
initiatives that keep minorities from using the political process should be
declared unconstitutional. But if that’s not possible, then strict scrutiny
should be used.
I have to admit to you I come to this position having lived in California for twenty-one years. I grew up in Chicago, and initiatives rarely are
used in the State of Illinois. I’ve got to admit that for all the years growing
up, going to college, teaching law, I don’t remember any initiatives on the
ballot. And then I remember when I moved to California in 1983, for the
very first election, November 1984, getting in the mail a telephone-sized
pamphlet that listed all the ballot initiatives and statements for and against
them.
Now what hasn’t been mentioned is, you don’t get these only for state
elections. There are also ballot initiatives at the local level; for example,
amendments to the city charter come by virtue of ballot initiatives. In 1999,
the voters of Los Angeles considered whether to adopt a new city charter. It
was 168 pages long, single-spaced, and came to the voters as a pamphlet
that they had to vote up or down on.
Having lived through that system for twenty-one years, having
watched it, I really came to the conclusion that the Framers of our Constitution were right here. That direct democracy isn’t the way to adopt laws.
And so that’s why when asked to present this keynote to you, I decided to
present the strongest argument, that it is lousy lawmaking, and that it should
be found to be unconstitutional.

